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DRAINAGE OF OIL AND GAS FROM ADJOINING
TRACTS-A FURTHER DEVELOPMENT
GEORGE W. HARDY III*
The recent Louisiana decision of Breaux v. Pan American Petro-
leum Corp.' treats two separate facets of the problem of the lessor's
right to relief for drainage of oil from beneath his property.
Breaux involved alleged drainage of oil from beneath the plaintiff-
lessor's property by a well drilled and operated by the plaintiff's
lessee on an adjoining tract within eighty feet of the plaintiff's
property line.
The essential allegations of the plaintiff's petition were: ( 1 ) the
plaintiff owned the land in question; (2) the defendant held a lease
on the adjoining property; (3) the defendant had drilled a well
within eighty feet of the plaintiff's property; (4) the defendant-
lessee had previously been placed in default; and, therefore, (5)
the plaintiff was entitled to damages equal to one-half of the one-
eighth royalty from the draining well. The trial judge sustained an
exception of no cause of action2 and the plaintiff appealed.
The Louisiana Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit sustained
the judgment of the trial court, holding that the plaintiff had failed
to allege a cause of action for damages under the implied covenant
to protect against drainage. However, the court went on to set
forth the elements of a cause of action for damages in this situation,
a meaningful utterance because the existence of relief in the form
of damages under similar facts had been a matter of substantial
doubt in Louisiana for a number of years.'
The court indicated that the elements of a cause of action for
damages for drainage under the implied covenant to protect the
leased premises include allegation and proof of: (1) the existence
of substantial drainage; (2) the quantity of oil or gas that would
have been produced from an offset well; (3) the profitability of an
0 Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge.
1. 163 So. 2d 406 (La. App.), writs denied, 246 La. 581, 165 So. 2d 481 (1964).
2. The exception of no cause of action in Louisiana procedure is roughly akin to
the demurrer failure to state a cause of action under the typical code system of
pleading or the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief under Rule
12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
3. See, e.g., Billeaud Planters, Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 245 F.2d 14 (5th Cir. 1957)
McCoy v. State Line Oil & Gas Co., 175 La. 231, 143 So. 58 (1932). Cancellation had
previously been recognized as a remedy in Louisiana in Swope v. Holmes, 169 La. 17,
124 So. 131 (1929), which was cited with approval in the principal case.
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offset well (i.e., repayment of investment cost) ; (4) the lessor's
share of the minerals that would have been produced from an offset
well had it been drilled at the proper time. In adopting these
elements the Louisiana court adhered to the majority rule 4 requir-
ing the offset well to be economically feasible, damages being
measured by the amount of production that would have resulted
from the offset well. The plaintiff in Breaux sought unsuccessfully
to establish in Louisiana the minority rule in cases of this kind,
which accepts as a proper measure of damages the lessor's royalty
share on drainage that he proves to have taken place from beneath
his property because of the lessee's failure to drill an offset well at
the proper time.5
Extending itself in dictum well beyond the requirements of the
case before it, the court strongly intimates that although a lessor
might be unable to meet the standards of proof enunciated by the
court in an ordinary drainage situation, he might nevertheless be
able to recover damages if his lessee has improvidently failed to
secure unitization of the part of the leased premises drained by the
adjoining well. In so doing the court would provide relief to the
lessor who may be substantially damaged but unable to secure
redress because an offset well would prove unprofitable to the lessee.
The second facet of the drainage problem was presented by the
lessor's contention that because the defendant-lessee held leases on
both tracts involved and was responsible for the drainage, a higher
duty rested upon the lessee to protect the plaintiff's premises. The
Louisiana court rejected this argument categorically.
The two problems raised by the Breaux case are separable. The
possible existence of a duty to secure unitization deals with the
content and administration of the implied covenant to protect
against drainage. However, the suggestion of a higher duty im-
posed on the lessee who causes drainage may involve more than an
extension of the implied covenant; it may impose a separate duty,
the breach of which might give rise to a right of cancellation or
4. Hartman Ranch Co. v. Associated Oil Co., 10 Cal. 2d 232, 73 P.2d 1163 (1937) ;
North Am. Petroleum Co. v. Knight, 321 P.2d 964 (Okla. 1958) ; Deep Rock Oil Corp.
v. Bilby, 199 Okla. 430, 186 P.2d 823 (1947) ; Junction Oil & Gas Co. v. Pratt, 99 Okla.
14, 225 Pac. 717 (1924) ; Texas Pac. Coal & Gas Co. v. Barker, 117 Tex. 418, 6 S.W.2d
1031 (1928); Texas Co. v. Ramsower, 7 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1928);
Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Bryan, 291 S.W. 692 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927); 5 Williams &
Meyers, Oil & Gas Law §§ 822, 825.2 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Williams & Meyers].
5. Olsen v. Sinclair Oil & Gas Co., 212 F. Supp. 332 (D. Wyo. 1963) ; Blair v. Clear
Creek Oil & Gas Co., 148 Ark. 301, 230 S.W. 286 (1921) ; Kleppner v. Lemon, 198 Pa.
581, 48 At. 483 (1901) ; 5 Williams & Meyers 78.
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damages and require different standards of proof and measure of
damages.6 These two questions will be treated separately, but it
will be seen that a definite possibility of overlap between the two
problems exists.
I
THE DUTY TO UNITIZE
The fact that oil and gas will migrate across property lines to a
well bore creating a center of low pressure is said to be the basis
for the implied covenant to protect against drainage.' It is a recogni-
tion of the lessor's legitimate interest in securing for himself his
just and equitable share of the minerals initially underlying his
property that has imposed the obligation of protection on the lessee.
On the other hand, the lessee has a legitimate interest in conserving
his own economic resources by protecting his pocketbook from drain-
age. In most jurisdictions this interest has been recognized in the
articulation of the elements of a cause of action for damages result-
ing from drainage. In accordance with the Louisiana court's decision
in Breaux v. Pan American Petroleum Corp.," the elements generally
include the existence of substantial drainage,9 the probable profit-
ability of drilling an offset well, 10 and proof of the amount of
production that would have been achieved from the offset well to
6. The existence of an implied covenant to refrain from depletory acts has been
suggested by Seed, The Implied Covenant in Oil and Gas Leases To Refrain From
Depletory Acts, 3 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 508 (1956).
7. See, e.g., Merrill, Covenants Implied in Oil and Gas Leases § 93, at 223 (2d ed.
1940) [hereinafter cited as Merrill]; 5 Williams & Meyers 78.
8. 163 So. 2d 406 (La. App.), writs denied, 246 La. 581, 165 So. 2d 481 (1964).
9. Gerson v. Anderson-Prichard Prod. Corp., 149 F.2d 444 (10th Cir. 1945)
Arkansas Natural Gas Corp. v. Pierson, 84 F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 1936) ; Lafitte Co. v.
United Fuel Gas Co., 177 F. Supp. 52 (E.D. Ky. 1959), aff'd, 284 F.2d 845 (6th Cir.
1960) ; Blake v. Texas Co., 123 F. Supp. 73 (E.D. Okla. 1954) ; Renner v. Monsanto
Chem. Co., 187 Kan. 158, 354 P.2d 326 (1960) ; Coyle v. North Am. Oil Consol., 201 La.
99, 9 So. 2d 473 (1942) ; Ramsey Petroleum Corp. v. Davis, 184 Okla. 155, 85 P.2d 427
(1938) ; Trimble v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 117 W. Va. 650, 187 S.E. 331 (1936). See
also 5 Williams & Meyers §§ 822, 822.1.
10. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Sellers, 174 F.2d 948 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 867 (1949) ; Geary v. Adams Oil & Gas Co., 31 F. Supp. 830 (E.D. Il. 1940) ;
Copple v. Carter Oil Co., 44 F. Supp. 579 (E.D. Ill. 1942) ; Hartman Ranch Co. v.
Associated Oil Co., 10 Cal. 2d 232, 73 P.2d 1163 (1937) ; Renner v. Monsanto Chem.
Co., supra note 9; Coyle v. North Am. Oil Consol., supra note 9; North Am. Petroleum
Co. v. Knight, 321 P.2d 964 (Okla. 1958) ; State v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 161 S.W.2d
366 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) ; Hutchins v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 161 S.W.2d 571 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1942). See also 5 Williams & Meyers §§ 822, 822.2.
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allow computation of the complaining lessor's royalty share.11 A
minority of jurisdictions has measured damages by computing the
amount of oil drained from the lessor's property and then determin-
ing the appropriate fractional portion to which the lessor would
have been entitled. 12
However, it is the requirement that the offset well be profitable
which gives clear recognition to the lessee's interest in conserving
his economic resources. Despite the existence of some damages to
the lessor, most courts seem to have accorded greater weight to this
economic interest of the lessee. There are, however, numerous
situations in which proof of the strict standards set up for recovery
of damages for drainage by failure to drill an offset well is impos-
sible, though the amount of drainage may be substantial. Under
modern conditions, a well costing as much as $300,000 is not un-
common; for an offset well to be profitable in the sense required by
the law as previously evolved, the mineral reserves would have to
be great. But assume that the total estimated amount of drainage
will represent a value of $50,000 with a total recovery of only
$150,000; the royalty share on this amount is a significant amount
to the average lessor. The Breaux decision thus offers some relief
for the lessor in this situation.
The suggestion of a duty to unitize is thoroughly compatible with
the "prudent operator" standard governing the application of the
implied covenants. The prudent operator reasonably does not de-
sire to squander his capital on a well that will recover only fifty per
cent of his investment, but the prudent operator might very def-
initely seek the establishment of a drilling and production unit for
the protection of his own interest as well as that of his lessor.
Whether such a unit should be established by exercise of the pooling
power, by full contractual agreement, or by compulsory order of a
conservation agency"a would depend on the facts of the case.
11. Hartman Ranch Co. v. Associated Oil Co., supra note 10; North Am. Petroleum
Co. v. Knight, tupra note 10; Deep Rock Oil Corp. v. Bilby, 199 Okla. 430, 186 P.2d
823 (1947) ; Junction Oil & Gas Co. v. Pratt, 99 Okla. 14, 225 Pac. 717 (1924) ; Sinclair
Oil & Gas Co. v. Bryan, 291 S.W. 692 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927). See also 5 Williams &
Meyers § 825.2.
12. Olsen v. Sinclair Oil & Gas Co., 212 F. Supp. 332 (D. Wyo. 1963) ; Blair v.
Clear Creek Oil & Gas Co., 148 Ark. 301, 230 S.W. 286 (1921) ; R. R. Bush Oil Co. v.
Beverly-Lincoln Land Co., 69 Cal. App. 2d 246, 158 P.2d 754 (1945) ; see Kleppner v.
Lemon, 198 Pa. 581, 48 At. 483 (1901).
13. It is conceivable that a lessee might make some capital of the fact that under
many conservation statutes [e.g., La. Rev. Stat. § 30:6F (1950)] the lessor may himself
provoke a hearing seeking a unitization of his premises when they are being drained by
a well on an adjoining tract. Conceivably, it might be argued that, because this adminis-
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Insofar as the duty to unitize may involve appearances before, or
applications to, conservation agencies, the idea accords with prior
suggestions by leading authorities that the conservation laws im-
pose further duties on lessees, perhaps not as a separate and distinct
group of obligations, but merely as an elaboration of existing ob-
ligations. 4 In this instance the duty to unitize is but a further
specification of the duty to protect.
There does not seem to be any widespread recognition, as such,
of a duty to unitize.' 5 However, one authority has pointed out that
the prudent operator standard has actually been used as a means of
protecting the lessee's action in effecting unitizations. 6 Additionally,
there seems to be a moderate but respectable body of authority im-
posing upon the lessee the obligation of representing the interests of
trative remedy is equally available to the lessor and lessee, the lessee should not be
expected to assume the burden of making applications for unitization for the purpose
of protection of the premises. However, this argument seems to the author to be weak
in view of the fact that one of the principal motivations of any lessor in executing a
lease contract is to shift the burdens of development and administration to the lessee.
Therefore, the mere fact that the possibility of applying for unitization is open to the
lessor should not alter the basic obligation of the lessee in this regard. This is not to
say that under some circumstances the availability of this remedy might not be signifi-
cant. If, for example, a lessor, with full knowledge of both the existing drainage and
the availability of his administrative remedy, took no action over an extended period
of time by way of demand upon the lessee or application to the state conservation body,
laches might conceivably be found. Some cases seem to place the burden of seeking
administrative relief on the lessor or require him to oppose proposals of the lessee
before the conservation body. See Chenoweth v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 314 F.2d 63
(10th Cir. 1963) ; Simmons v. Pure Oil Co., 124 So. 2d 161 (La. App. 1960), aff'd, 241
La. 592, 129 So. 2d 786 (1961) ; Mims v. Hilliard, 125 So. 2d 205 (La. App. 1960).
Insofar as they so hold, these cases appear unsound because they neglect the above
noted fact that one of the principal motivations of a mineral lessor is to have the
lessee assume the burdens of development. Further, as may be implied from the Sim-
mons case, supra, it seems unsound to permit the lessee to hide at will behind adminis-
trative orders and establish conclusive proof of behavior as a prudent operator by
proving action pursuant to regulatory order. Such a view ignores the realities of the
manner in which most conservation bodies act upon unopposed applications of operators.
14. Merrill, Fulfilling Impied Covenant Obligations Administratively, 9 Okla. L.
Rev. 125 (1956) ; Merrill, Implied Covenants, Conservation and Unitization, 2 Okla.
L. Rev. 469, 4-78 (1949) ; Merrill, The Modern Image of the Prudent Operator, 10 Rocky
Mt. Mineral Law Institute 107 (1965). See also 5 Williams & Meyers §§ 868-69.
15. The concept is approved in In re Shailer's Estate, 266 P.2d 613, 617 (Okla. 1954).
16. See Merrill, The Modern Image of the Prudent Operator, supra note 14, at 107.
Among the prominent cases cited by Professor Merrill are: Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Peterson, 218 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1954) ; Boone v. Kerr-McGee Oil Indus. 217 F.2d 63
(10th Cir. 1954) ; Kenoyer v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 173 Kan. 183. 245 P.2d 176
(1952) ; Vance v. Hurley, 215 La. 805, 41 So.2d 724 (1949) ; Tiller v. Fields, 301 S.W.
2d 185 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957). There is some authority in Texas which gives support
to the notion that the lessee operates under no duty to effect unitization as a prudent
operator. See Waters v. Bruner, 355 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) Natural Gas
Distrib. Corp. v. Williams, 355 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
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the lessor before administrative agencies as a part of the prudent
operator standard.17
Suggestion of a duty to unitize brings with it consideration of the
standards of proof to be met. The Breaux opinion intimates that an
aggrieved lessor might recover damages measured by the amount
of production attributable to the drained tract if the tract had been
included in a unit. But several questions remain: What are the ele-
ments of the cause of action ? Does the profitability test have any
role to play? What defenses are available to the lessee?
The essential elements of the cause of action might include: (1)
the existence of substantial drainage; (2) the lessee's actual or con-
structive knowledge of the drainage;18 (3) the drainage radius of
the well (the part of the lessor's property that should have been
included in a production unit) ; (4) the amount of drainage; (5)
the lessee's failure to reasonably utilize means for unitization, and
(6) the computed share of the lessor's property in minerals already
drained. Additionally, there is the possibility that the profitability
rule may not have disappeared entirely from the scene. It has
recently been held in Louisiana that an operator seeking establish-
ment of a unit by compulsory order may be required to pay his
proportionate share of the original drilling costs in cash, the driller
of the well not being limited to recovery of his investment cost by
withholding production. 9 This possibility may mean that if the
courts impose a duty to unitize, the profitability rule might be re-
tained in modified form. If the facts demonstrate that the well is
not sufficiently productive to allow the lessee to recover the drilling
costs he would be liable to contribute had he provoked the hearing
resulting in establishment of the unit, a forceful argument can be
made for denying recovery to the lessor. It seems likely that the
profitability rule would be retained as thus modified when the lessee
17. Baldwin v. Kubetz, 148 Cal. App. 2d 937, 307 P.2d 1005 (1957) ; Elliott v. Pure
Oil Co., 10 III. 2d 146, 139 N.E.2d 295 (1957) ; Willingham v. Bryson, 294 S.W.2d 421
(Tex. Civ. App. 1956); Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Hardy, 370 S.W.2d 904 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1963). These cases are collected and discussed by Merrill, The Modern
Image of the Prudent Operator, supra note 14, at 133-37.
18. Mention of actual knowledge as an element of the cause of action may seem to
introduce a subjective element into what is otherwise a process of judging conduct by
an objective standard. However, proof that the lessee either had actual knowledge or,
as a reasonable and prudent operator, should have known of the existence of the
drainage complained of should suffice to meet this requirement.
19. Superior Oil Co. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 165 So. 2d 905 (La. App.), 'writs
denied, 246 La. 842, 167 So. 2d 668 (1964). It may be of some significance that the
Louisiana Supreme Court denied writs on the ground that the judgment of the court
of appeal was not final.
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is not the unit operator, though he may be required to invest capital
in the unit well. Retention of the profitability standard does not,
however, destroy the utility of the unitization concept. It is consis-
tent with the jurisprudence adopting that standard; it is also con-
sistent with the prudent operator standard of which it is a part. A
lessee could not reasonably be expected to drill an unprofitable well
to protect a lease, so he should not reasonably be expected to seek
formation of an uneconomic unit.
Considering the question of defenses available to the lessee, it
seems that he could defend only on grounds showing that (1) a
reasonable and prudent operator would not have formed a unit, or
(2) he had exhausted all means reasonably at his command for
establishing a unit.
A duty to unitize, suggested by the Breaux decision, is a logical
extension of the covenant to protect. The covenant was conceived in
an effort to require the lessee, as a reasonable and prudent operator,
to achieve protection by using all means available, not merely some
of them. Development of conservation practices and, in some states,
compulsory unitization simply places another means for protection
in the hands of the lessee. As long as the interest of the lessee in
protecting himself from predictable economic loss is given reason-
able consideration, as suggested in the modification of the profit-
ability standard, there is no reason why the lessee should not be
called upon to exercise all due diligence in protecting the interest of
his lessor by seeking the establishment of a production unit including
the acreage of the drained lease within the drainage radius of the
offending well.
II
DRAINAGE CAUSED BY THE LESSEE
While the dictum suggesting the existence of a duty to unitize as
part of the implied covenant to protect against drainage seems
sound, the court's holding that the rights of the lessor are no differ-
ent when his own lessee is causing the drainage raises an often
mooted question. The realities of this situation are underscored by
comparison with the normal drainage cases. If A and B are lessees
of adjoining tracts and J causes drainage from beneath B's lease,
the natural competitive situation created gives B's lessor at least
reasonable assurance that B will be spurred to protect his own in-
terest. Thus, B's self-interest will work to protect his lessor's
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interest, though occasionally a little prodding by the lessor may be
required. However, in the factual situation presented by the Breaux
case, this competitive incentive is not present because the lessee is
competing with himself. No matter who participates in the produc-
tion from a given well, and no matter what lease tracts are drained
by it, the lessee holding leases from two different lessors on adjoin-
ing tracts normally pays only a specified royalty on production from
any given well. Existence of a higher royalty (e.g., 1/6 versus 1/8)
on the drained tract also provides some inducement for not com-
mencing operations on the drained tract. Moreover, if two leases
can be drained effectively by a single well, the lessee may be sorely
tempted to indulge his legitimate interest in minimizing drilling
costs. Common sense dictates that the law should not provide an
opportunity for the lessee to save on drilling costs without some
sanctions to assure proper protection of the drained lessor.
The temptations presented by this non-competitive situation have
been dealt with in most oil and gas jurisdictions, but the approaches
have varied widely. Some cases have apparently considered of little
or no significance the fact that the lessee of the complaining lessor is
causing the drainage. 20 Others have categorically denied that there
is any significance attaching to this fact.2 Still others have suggested
the existence of a higher duty on the part of the lessee causing drain-
20. Billeaud Planters, Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 245 F.2d 14 (5th Cir. 1957) ; Gerson v.
Anderson-Prichard Prod. Corp. 149 F.2d 444 (10th Cir. 1945) ; Cooper v. Ohio Oil Co.,
108 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1939) ; Arkansas Natural Gas Corp. v. Pierson, 84 F.2d 468
(8th Cir. 1936) ; Hamilton v. Empire Gas & Fuel Co., 297 Fed. 422 (8th Cir. 1924) ;
Clear Creek Oil & Gas Co. v. Brunk, 160 Ark. 574, 255 S.W. 7 (1923) ; Powers v.
Bridgeport Oil Co., 238 Ill. 397, 87 N.E. 381 (1909) ; Myers v. Shell Petroleum Corp.,
153 Kan. 287, 110 P.2d 810 (1941) ; Leeper Oil Co. v. Rowland, 239 Ky. 295, 39 S.W.2d
486 (1931) ; Hood v. Southern Prod. Co., 206 La. 642, 19 So. 2d 336 (1944) ; Deep Rock
Oil Corp. v. Bilby, 199 Okla. 430, 186 P.2d 823 (1947) ; Chapman v. Sohio Petroleum
Co., 297 S.W.2d 885 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) ; Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Bryan, 291 S.W.
692 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927). These and other cases are cited and discussed in 5 Wil-
liams & Meyers §§ 831-32.2, pp. 212-23.
21. Monsanto Chem. Co. v. Andreae, 245 Miss. 11, 147 So. 2d 116 (1962) ; Hutchins
v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 161 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942). In Monsanto Chem.
Co. v. Sykes, 245 Miss. 207, 147 So. 2d 290 (1962), on suggestion of error, 247 Miss.
227, 149 So. 2d 20 (1963), relief was denied even though the defendant lessee was
causing the drainage. However, it appeared that some $483,000 had been expended to
drill and rework the protection well which could not be put in production. The court
regarded this as due diligence in protecting the premises. This case does not really
seem to be one denying that there is any significance to be attached to the fact that
the lessee caused the drainage. Rather, it turns on simple absence of sufficient proof
demonstrating that the defendant had not acted as a prudent operator. Both of the
Monsanto cases, supra, impose limitations on the prior decision of Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Millette, 221 Miss. 1, 72 So. 2d 176 (1954), in which the Mississippi court had
adopted the concept of "fraudulent drainage."
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age by wells on adjoining land.22 In seeming recognition of the
higher duty, these latter cases have either relaxed the requirement
of proofthat an offset well be profitable, 23 or negated the effect of
an express offset clause freeing the lessee from any duty to drill an
offset well, 24 or declared that acceptance of delay rentals with knowl-
edge of the drainage does not waive the lessor's right to seek re-
lief.25 Leading authorities have sharply criticized the notion that a
higher duty exists for the lessee who causes the drainage.26 One
writer has suggested, however, that the courts should in fact recog-
nize the existence of two distinct obligations concerning drainage of
the leased premises: (1) the obligation to protect against drainage
caused by a stranger, and (2) the obligation to refrain from dep-
letory acts.27
Some of those cases suggesting the existence of a higher duty
when the lessee is himself causing the drainage have used the term
"fraudulent drainage. ' 2  This phraseology has been criticized as
an unnecessary term of opprobrium.2 9 One case has suggested the
22. Olsen v. Sinclair Oil & Gas Co., 212 F. Supp. 332 (D. Wyo. 1963); Geary v.
Adams Oil & Gas Co., 31 F. Supp. 830 (E.D. Ill. 1940) ; Blair v. Clear Creek Oil & Gas
Co., 148 Ark. 301, 230 S.W. 286 (1921), Annot., 19 A.L.R. 430 (1922) ; Hartman Ranch
Co. v. Associated Oil Co., 10 Cal. 2d 232, 73 P.2d 1163 (1937); R. R. Bush Oil Co. v.
Beverly-Lincoln Land Co., 69 Cal. App. 2d 246, 158 P.2d 754 (1945) ; Hughes v. Bus-
seyville Oil & Gas Co., 180 Ky. 545, 203 S.W. 515 (1918) (dictum) ; Central Kentucky
Natural Gas Co. v. Williams, 249 Ky. 242, 60 S.W.2d 580 (1933) (dictum) ; Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Millette, supra note 21; Millette v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 209 Miss.
687, 48 So. 2d 344 (1950) ; Dillard v. United Fuel Gas Co., 114 W. Va. 684, 173 S.E.
573 (1934) ; Trimble v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 113 W. Va. 839, 169 S.E. 529 (1933) ;
Adkins v. Huntington Dev. & Gas Co., 113 W. Va. 490, 168 S.E. 366 (1932). These and
other cases are collected and discussed in 5 Williams & Meyers §§ 824-24.2, pp. 125-48.
23. Geary v. Adams Oil & Gas Co., supra note 22; R. R. Bush Oil Co. v. Beverly-
Lincoln Land Co., supra note 22; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Millette, 221 Miss. 1, 72
So. 2d 176 (1954) ; Adkins v. Huntington Dev. & Gas Co., supra note 22. These cases
are collected and discussed in 5 Williams & Meyers 127.
24. R. R. Bush Oil Co. v. Beverly-Lincoln Land Co., 69 Cal. App. 2d 246, 158 P.2d
754 (1945) ; Millette v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 209 Miss. 687, 48 So. 2d 344 (1950). See
discussion in 5 Williams & Meyers 128.
25. Blair v. Clear Creek Oil & Gas Co., 148 Ark. 301, 230 S.W. 286 (1921) ; Trimble
v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 113 W. Va. 839, 169 S.E. 529 (1933). Other cases have re-
fused to apply other express lease clauses in situations where the drainage complained
of is caused by the defendant lessee. For a full discussion of these cases, see 5 Williams
& Meyers 128-29.
26. Merrill 260; 5 Williams & Meyers §§ 824-824.2, especially § 824.2, pp. 144-47.
27. Seed, supra note 6.
28. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Millette, 221 Miss. 1, 72 So. 2d 176 (1954)
Kleppner v. Lemon, 197 Pa. 430, 47 Atl. 353 (1900) on reargument, 198 Pa. 581, 48
At. 483 (1901) ; Adkins v. Huntington Dev. & Gas Co., 113 W. Va. 490, 168 S.E. 366
(1933) ; Lamp v. Locke, 89 W. Va. 138, 108 S.E. 889 (1921).
29. 5 Williams & Meyers 143.
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principle of unjust enrichment as a basis for imposition of liability
on the lessee, without regard to the profitability of an offset well.3 0
This, too, has been criticized as a "naive view of the matter."'" The
cases suggesting a higher duty have also been criticized as unsub-
stantiated by authority.8 2 If lack of direct authority for a new con-
cept in the jurisprudence were sufficient to inhibit its articulation, we
should never have had a fully elaborated system of law. Particularly
is this true in the area of oil and gas law in which, for example, the
evolution of the implied covenants discloses that the courts have
quite often proceeded as much by instinct and common sense as by
precedent.
It must be admitted that the term "fraudulent drainage" may be
unnecessary and inappropriate when applied to many ordinary
drainage situations. As suggested by one leading treatise, the term
apparently originated in history as a component of a good faith
standard for judging the lessee's conduct and as a device to secure
equitable jurisdiction."8 But there may be some instances in which
fraud is the proper term. 4 Moreover, when the lessee of adjoining
tracts of land causes drainage from beneath one tract to the other
many factors cry out for some sanction, though the conduct may fall
short of what may properly be termed fraud.
30. Geary v. Adams Oil & Gas Co., 31 F. Supp. 830 (E.D. I11. 1940). The decision
in R. R. Bush Oil Co. v. Beverly-Lincoln Land Co., 69 Cal. App. 2d 246, 158 P.2d 754
(1945), articulates the higher duty placed upon the lessee of two adjoining tracts in
terms of an implied covenant not to drain oil from beneath one of the two tracts by a
well located on the other.
31. 5 Williams & Meyers 145.
32. Id. at 142-43.
33. See 5 Williams & Meyers 143. The authors speculate that because at one time
both Pennsylvania and West Virginia followed the good faith standard, rather than
the prudent operator standard, the term "fraudulent drainage" simply meant action-
able or unlawful drainage. This seems reasonable. It is also there acknowledged, and
the present author subscribes fully to this idea, that the fraud concept was a device by
which equitable jurisdiction was obtained. In some of the early cases the court was being
asked, as a court of equity, to grant specific performance or cancellation. As breach
of a covenant was actionable at law, with damages the only available relief, some
device was necessary to bring controversies of this kind within equity jurisdiction. In
this regard, see, e.g., Kleppner v. Lemon, 197 Pa. 440, 47 Atd. 353 (1900) ; Adkins v.
Huntington Dev. & Gas Co., 113 W. Va. 490, 168 S.E. 366 (1933) ; Lamp v. Locke, 89
W. Va. 138, 108 S.E. 89 (1921).
34. There is an increasing amount of jurisprudence indicating that in exercising any
pooling power granted in a mineral lease, the lessee has a duty to deal fairly with
the interest of his lessor. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Peterson, 218 F.2d 926
(10th Cir. 1954) (by implication) ; Boone v. Kerr-McGee Oil Indus., 217 F.2d 63 (10th
Cir. 1954), in which the obligation to deal in good faith was assumed for purposes of
argument, and the lessee was found to have acted within the dictates of this limitation;
also McDonald v. Grande Corp., 148 So. 2d 441 (La. App. 1962) ; Imes v. Globe Oil &
Ref. Co., 184 Okla. 79, 84 P.2d 1106 (1938).
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For initial consideration is the suggestion that the lessee draining
tract X by a well on tract Y is, with reference to the rule of capture,
in the same position as the lessor of the draining tract.35 This state-
ment neglects the fact that the lessee in such a case is fettered by
obligations to his adjoining lessor that do not burden the draining
landowner and would not burden another lessee. Thus, the lessee
should act at all times with full and proper regard for his obligations
to both lessors.8" The existence of a contractual relationship be-
tween the adjoining landowner and the lessee immediately distin-
guishes him from the stranger.
A second factor to be considered is that the lessee of both tracts X
and Y is in a position of superior knowledge. He possesses the tech-
nical information that may reasonably disclose to him substantial
drainage of oil from beneath the adjoining tract, and he possesses
the resources to discern the meaning of this information. The lessor
often possesses neither the information nor the resources to obtain
it, though on occasion certain logs may be available to the lessor
through state conservation agencies. But availability does not elimi-
nate the fact that the lessor may not possess the personal resources
to have this information fully interpreted to demonstrate the exist-
ence of drainage. If the draining well is what is commonly known
in the industry as a "tight hole," the information concerning its
performance is probably more closely guarded than most national
defense secrets and, therefore, unavailable to the drained lessor.
A third factor to be considered is that the lessee commonly has
at hand contractual and regulatory devices8 7 by which he may achieve
protection of his adjoining lessor, short of drilling an offset well.
Standard leases in circulation today often permit the lessee to pool
his lessor's property for purposes of conservation and proper devel-
opment by filing a declaration to that effect in the public records of
35. 5 Williams & Meyers § 824.2; Merrill 260.
36. There is a reasonable analogy to be made between the authorities cited in note
34 supra and the situation in which a lessee of two adjoining tracts finds himself.
When a lessee exercises a pooling power, he deals with the interests of several parties
as well as his own and is in a position to deal unfairly if not held to a standard of
fair conduct. The same is true when the lessee owns leases on two adjoining tracts. It
seems that again he is decidedly in a position permitting him to prefer one lessor over
another or to prefer his own interests over those of one of his lessors. The circumstances
clearly demand that he be held to a standard of conduct assuring fair dealing with
all interests in question.
37. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 27-531 (1956) ; Ark. Stat. Ann. § 53-115 (Supp. 1963);
La. Rev. Stat. § 30:9 (Supp. 1964) ; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 52, §§ 287.1-287.15 (Supp. 1964).
Variations in the content of these and other unitization statutes will, of course, have an
effect on application of the suggested duty to unitize.
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the appropriate county or parish."8 Absent such authority, the
lessee may apply to the state conservation agency for establishment
of a production unit. This remedy is, of course, limited to those
states where compulsory unitization is available. 9 It may be ob-
served that the early Pennsylvania case of Kleppner v. Lemon 40 had
the effect, through the auspices of equitable powers, of pooling that
part of the plaintiff-lessor's property within the drainage radius of
the offending well with the part of the adjoining land drained by the
well to measure damages. Damages were awarded by computing
one-eighth of the production attributable to the drained tract by the
following formula:
Damages Y/8 x (total production x plaintiff's acreage drained)
total acreage drained
Thus, far in advance of modern conservation statutes, under cir-
cumstances clearly showing that the defendant-lessee knew he was
draining, substantial quantities from beneath the plaintiff-lessor's
property, and in all probability was doing so intentionally, the
38. The following provisions, appearing in the M. L. Bath Co. Form 42 CPM-New
South Louisiana Revised Six (6)-Pooling, are typical of those now in use in Louisiana.
Lessee, at its option, is hereby given the right and power without any further
approval from Lessor, at any time and from time to time, to pool or combine
the land or mineral interest covered by this lease, or any portion thereof, with
other land, lease or leases and mineral interests in the immediate vicinity
thereof, when, in Lessee's judgment, it is necessary or advisable to do so in
order to properly explore or develop or operate said premises so as to promote
the conservation of oil, gas or other minerals in and under and that may be
produced from said premises or to prevent waste or to avoid the drilling of
unnecessary wells or to comply with the spacing or unitization order of any
Regulatory Body of the State of Louisiana or the United States having juris-
diction. . . . Lessee shall execute and file for record in the Conveyance Records
of the Parish in which the land herein leased is situation a declaration describ-
ing the pooled acreage; and upon such filing, the unit or units shall thereby
become effective, except that when a unit is created by order of a Regulatory
Body the pooling shall be effective as of the effective date of such order, and no
declaration shall be required in connection therewith.
39. For examples of compulsory unitization statutes, see note 37 supra. Texas is, of
course, the most prominent oil producing state not having a compulsory unitization
statute. It is noted by Merrill, The Modern Image of the Prudent Operator, supra note
14, at 107, that the problem of the duty to unitize may be brought into focus in Texas
by recent decisions limiting the authority to grant special allowables to small tracts to
permit profitable drilling thereon. See Halbouty v. Railroad Comm'n, 163 Tex. 417, 357
S.W.2d 364 (1962) ; Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 162 Tex. 274, 346 S.W.2d
801 (1961).
40. 197 Pa. 430, 37 Atl. 353 (1900), on reargument, 198 Pa. 581, 48 Atd. 483 (1901).
On reargument the measure of damages was modified to accord with that given in the
text.
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Pennsylvania court measured damages by means of a formula
roughly approximating unit participation. 1 This was done in the
absence of means by which a unit could have been established
through exercise of a pooling power or by compulsory regulatory
order.
The preceding factors suggest the strong need for some sanction
to inhibit a lessee from abusing his position of advantage and suc-
cumbing to the temptation to indulge his interest at the expense of
one of his lessors. As previously noted, one author suggests the ex-
istence of a separate and distinct obligation on the lessee-the ob-
ligation to refrain from depletory acts.42 Another authority suggests
certain shifts in the burdens of pleading and persuasion. 43 The sug-
gested covenant to refrain from depletory acts has been subjected to
much criticism, and the notion of shifts in the burdens of pleading
and proof has not yet been accepted.44 However, it seems that the
duty to unitize suggested by the Louisiana court, with one slight
modification, may offer substantial relief to the lessor whose
premises are being drained by his own lessee.
Administration of the duty to unitize when the lessee is operating
the offending well might proceed like the ordinary case of drainage
by a stranger, but with this exception: the profitability test might not
be appropriate. If the means to achieve unitization are available to
the lessee of the adjoining tracts, and the lessor can reasonably
prove that the lessee was actually or constructively aware of the
drainage he was causing and failed to use due diligence in protect-
ing the adjoining lessor, profitability is not a factor to be considered.
The lessee's money is already in the ground. If the well is unprofit-
41. Some conservation statutes contemplate a volumetric method of calculating unit
participation, where possible. However, as a practical matter, this is often impossible,
and in most instances participation is computed on a surface acreage basis, particularly
during developed mineral stages. See, e.g., La. Rev. Stat. § 30:9D (1950).
42. Seed, supra note 6.
43. 5 Williams & Meyers § 824.2, pp. 147-48. The authors would shift the burden of
going forward with the evidence and the burden of persuasion on the issue of profita-
bility of a proposed offset well to the lessee in instances where the lessee is the operator
of the draining well.
44. It is noteworthy that in Elliott v. Pure Oil Co., 10 Ill. 2d 146, 139 N.E.2d 295
(1956), the burden of showing that an offset well will not be profitable was placed upon
the lessee, who, in that particular case, caused the drainage in question. However, the
court does not state whether this latter fact was the cause for thus placing the burden
of persuasion. Although it is speculative, it might be concluded that this case would
place the burden of persuasion as to unprofitability on the lessee in all cases. This is
not an unreasonable suggestion in light of the fact that the lessee is in a position of
superior knowledge. However, it would clearly be out of line with the present majority
attitude on this matter.
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able, the lessee's loss is already fixed. This fact should not, however,
permit the lessee to disregard his obligation to his adjoining lessor.
The lessor's property, to the lessee's actual or constructive knowl-
edge, is being drained in a manner warranting establishment of a
production unit. This is not a situation in which the prudence of the
lessee's conduct is being measured by whether the fictional prudent
operator would have either (1) invested fresh capital in an offset
well, or (2) invested fresh capital by seeking establishment of a
unit of which he is not the operator and to the cost of which he could
be required to make a cash contribution. The irrevocable decision to
invest has already been made, and the profitability standard has no
role to play in this fact situation.
It is true that assessment of damages for failure to use diligence
in achieving establishment of a production unit in this situation may
increase the lessee's loss, already fixed by his investment in a well
that will not pay out. However, had due diligence been exercised
and the unit established, the lessee's loss would not have been thus
increased. Adherence by the lessee to the standard of conduct his
adjoining lessor has a right to expect of him would have avoided
this increased loss. If there is a penalty involved here for the lessee,
it does not seem unfair because it would have been avoided by due
diligence.
A final observation is that this use of the concept of a duty to
unitize does not impede the ends of conservation, nor does it thwart
the lessee's legitimate interest in minimizing drilling costs. In fact
it promotes both while requiring reasonable diligence in the protec-
tion of all parties to whom the operator may be contractually ob-
ligated. What is here suggested, then, is not a "higher duty" on the
lessee with dual obligations. It is, in effect, a modification of the
existing duty by elimination of the profitability standard when the
lessee is the operator of a potential unit well. Profitability of an
offset well is an unrelated consideration, and profitability of the unit
well itself is irrelevant because the lessee's capital is already invested.
CONCLUSION
The decision in Breaux v. Pan American Petroleum Corp.45 ap-
pears sound in suggesting the existence of a duty to secure unitiza-
tion of drained premises. Insofar as Breaux holds that there is no
difference whatsoever in the substantive rights of the lessor whose
45. 163 So. 2d 406 (La. App.), writs denied, 246 La. 581, 165 So. 2d 481 (1964).
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property is drained by a well on adjoining land under lease to his
lessee, there is at least some doubt.
The duty to unitize when another operator is the lessee of the ad-
joining tract may be administered exactly like the duty to drill an
offset well. Profitability may have a proper role to play if unitization
would require the lessee of the drained tract to invest fresh capital.
However, profitability is not a relevant factor if the defendant-
lessee is also the operator of the offending well.
The only questions that should properly be raised when the
defendant is lessee of both tracts are: (1) Has substantial drainage
warranting unitization occurred? (2) Was the lessee, or should he
reasonably have been, aware of the drainage? (3) Has the lessee
failed to use due diligence to achieve unitization? (4) What is the
drainage radius of the draining well? (5) To what participation
would the complaining lessor have been entitled had the unit been
formed at the proper time? When a stranger to the lessor-lessee
relationship is causing the drainage, the lessee should be entitled to
require proof of probable profitability if he would be liable to pay in
cash his share of the development costs of the unit well.
The enforcement of the covenant to protect against drainage has
too long been considered solely in the context of an offset well, a
technique of protection thoroughly in keeping with the rule of cap-
ture and the customs of the industry in its infancy. But the industry
is grown now. If the advent of conservation adds sophistication to
drainage problems, it also adds to the means available for protec-
tion. These developments should not be overlooked.
